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[S]o long as people are guilty of crimes and perpetrate them, judgment is essential … There must be
judges. There must be law. Law must be enforced and law should be universal … I think it’s always
embarrassing if the judge is someone who himself doesn’t suffer from the action or is someone who has
just won the battle.1
Aims and structure of this paper
I have three overarching theoretical points I want to make in this paper that inspire my motivation to discuss,
in the context of comparative law, plunder in Palestine.2
First, I consider the Middle Eastern tragedy a structural aspect of the capitalist extractive mode and the
victims of brutality by Israel similar to those victimized by European countries and the United States in other
Middle Eastern theaters and elsewhere. Apartheid is alive and well as one of the ways a white minority rules
the global majority of color, the global north rules the global south, and the rich rule the poor.3 I consider
Zionism and its victims a manifestation of an unfortunate rule rather than an exception in the global scenario.4
I believe that the rhetoric of Israeli exceptionalism introduces a degree of parochialism into the traditional
discussion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that does not address—either theoretically or politically—the cause
of its victims.5 A dialogue in the context of comparative law should inform a more cosmopolitan approach.6
My second motivation is to demonstrate, through an examination of the history of comparative law and its
particular attitude towards Israel, that while imperialism is a structural component of capitalism7 it is also a
consequence of the choice of consolidating socialismwithin one country, as Joseph Stalin andNikolai Bukharin
did in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1924 and 1925. Imperialism is a consequence of power concen-
tration, shared by the form of modern state capitalism called realized socialism.8 The Zionist project could not
have been successful without the massive delivery of weapons by the Soviet Bloc and I consequently believe
that responsibility for plunder in Palestine must be shared by both combatants in the “long Cold War.”9
Zionism belongs to the Western project of nationalism, with its capacity to deploy the powerful idea of the
nation state. I think that a hardnosed reflection on the role and responsibilities of the Soviet Bloc and of the
Western left in causing and legitimizing the Palestinian Nakba10 is very important for cosmopolitan truth and
understanding. It also informs a better critique of the comparative law project and its Orientalism.11
Thirdly, I would like to show how the cultural construction of Israel as a state endowed with a so-called
mixed legal system12 is a classic case of the West’s imposition of its own values of modernity on communities
elsewhere long living together in relative peace. A Western rulebook of ideas and institutions (including the
very notion of a sovereign territorial state) has determined Middle Eastern power centralization.13 This partic-
ular colonial project, as every other one, has been anointed with legitimacy by the early rhetoric of civilization
(and lack thereof), later supplanted by notions of democracy and the rule of law. According to such rhetoric,
UgoMattei is the corresponding author.
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locals are uncivilized because they do not understand individual exclusive property law, the only “rational”
form of private law. They cannot be part of the “civilized nations” because they have no states, the only le-
gitimate producers of positive law. Plunder is therefore legitimized as a civilizing mission, in the mode of the
Wilsonian white man’s burden,14 because it brings progress and prosperity, to the point of allowing the desert
to bloom. Consequently, the whole narrative of legitimacy has been cast in individual-centered and profession-
alized terms, erasing the commons-based laws of previously stateless local communities.15
After discussion of these three issues, I will try to sketch a pars construens of this paper where I argue that
comparative law, in order to contribute to a resilient legal culture, should devote time to understanding such
commons-based vernacular institutions, thereby providing materials for overcoming the current pedestrian
alternatives of the Two-State and One-State solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian tragedy.
The author acknowledges that this paper does not address in detail the histories of the foundation of the
Zionist movement (beginning in the late nineteenth century), 1915 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, 1916
Sykes-PicotAgreement, or 1917 BalfourDeclaration, on the one hand, or—after 1948—what Israelis call the 1967
Six Day War and Palestinians call al-Naksah (Setback), 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, 1982 killings of 2,000
unarmed Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Israel-allied Christianmilitias, 1987 Palestinian
Intifada (Uprising) in the West Bank and Gaza, 2000 al-Aqsa Intifada, 2014 Israel-Gaza assault, myriad failed
diplomatic endeavors, or other important events on the timeline of themore than 100-year history of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. These are intentional dialectic abstractions in the modes of extension and vantage point:
this paper is—first and last—about comparative law, capitalism, and imperialism, not history or anthropology.16
Furthermore, as the late BelgianMarxist historianMarcel Liebman—in an essay about the flaws in the Zion-
ist formulation of “A country without a people for a people without a country”—writes:
It is not here a question of invoking the past and searching about in it out of pure love of history, or in
order to go back to the ultimate beginnings of an injustice: what is important is to show the constancy
of a policy, the permanence of a kind of logic, the continuity of a situation which are now manifesting
more gravely than ever before their baneful consequences.17
Palestine, once having been understood as a victim ofWestern intervention for plunder, could become a labora-
tory for experimentation of commons-based solutions organized in a loose ecological network. Such commons-
based No-State solution, I argue, could serve the interests of the people rather than those of the global con-
formation of power, successor of the national territorial state that takes the form of the military-industrial-
technological complex profiting from war and devastation.18
Modernity and its institutions—including international law—are without resonance with the people of the
Middle East. Perhaps, after the point of no return determined by the institutions of extraction, new solutions
based on ecology and the commons rather than on markets and the state might regenerate the social fabric.19
Once again, the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East could become the crib for a new civilization.
Plunder in palestine
On 15 May 1948, Britain relinquished sovereignty exercised through a mandate over Palestine; Plan D (Plan
Dalet), embraced two months earlier by David Ben-Gurion and his aides at the Tel Aviv headquarters of Ha-
ganah—with its compulsory Jewish conscription—was already in full gear. Plan Dwas a strategy to de-Arabize
Palestine: to cleanse it from its aboriginal inhabitants in order to allow the settlement of Jews.20 Among many
Palestinian villages attacked by Zionist forces of theHaganah, Irgun, and LEHI,21 later to form the official Army
of the newborn Zionist State (Israel Defense Forces “IDF”), Haifa was a thriving Palestinian city from which
Arab inhabitants were removed in April with British assistance. Upon the Israeli Declaration of Independence,
more than 250,000 Palestinians were already gone: their land and businesses were destroyed or transferred into
Zionist hands. All together, the establishment of the State of Israel (War of Independence to Zionists/Nakba to
Palestinians) eradicated almost 800,000 Palestinians, destroyed 531 villages, and rendered eleven urban neigh-
borhoods free of Arabs.
Very soon thereafter, property law—a Western legal institution that invariably plays a starring role in the
legitimization of Western plunder—made its appearance in Israel. Under the Absentees’ Property Law, 5710–
1950, a custodian was granted control of land owned during Israel’s War of Independence by any person who
was (1) a citizen or subject of a country that fought, or sent troops to fight, against Israel during the War
(Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen), (2) present in one of these countries
during theWar, (3) present during theWar in a portion of the area of the British Mandate that was not included
in the State of Israel, (4) a citizen or resident of the British Mandate who left her place of residence during the
War to live outside of the area of the mandate, or (5) a citizen or resident of the British Mandate who left to
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live in an area formerly included in the British Mandate but then held by the countries that fought against the
establishment of the State of Israel (after the War, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria each took possession of a portion of
the area of the British Mandate that the United Nations had designed for a separate Palestinian State).22
Such land, which according to the Absentees’ Property Law was held in “custody for owners,” was in fact
plundered from legitimate Palestinian owners whom the enacting State of Israel constantly precluded from
returning. Later, it was transferred to the Israeli Development Authority (“IDA”) and became one of the com-
ponents of the publicly owned land of Israel.
It is a basic law of Israel (sometimes heralded as a proof of the socialist inclination of the Zionist movement)
that land—93 % publicly owned in Israel—is inalienable and falls into three categories:
– owned by the State
– owned by the Jewish National Fund (“JNF”)
– owned by the IDA
Therefore, technically speaking, no physical person owns the land, which is a classic structure of colonial prop-
erty law (as well as traditional English land law) that has very little to do with being socialist.23 Rather, such
an arrangement grants the Israeli Government the power to prevent non-Jews from buying land, deploying a
strategy of Zionism dating back to the late nineteenth century. Zionists have gained propaganda mileage from
their claim of having “purchased” the land from the Arabs; in fact, the portion of Palestine so acquired was a
mere 5%-6%.
Many intellectuals remain in denial of Ilan Pappé’s highly documented description of PlanD (and of the pre-
decessor Plans A, B, and C) as a planned Zionist ethnic cleansing of Palestine (see footnote 21 above). Prominent
Israeli historian Professor BennyMorris, for example, imagines the voluntary displacement of the Palestinians.24
By now, however, many scholars are at least skeptical of the narrative of voluntary exodus by the Palestinians
to permit the military forces of Arab neighbors to invade the newborn State of Israel.25
Dispossession, murder, and plunder have been going on for a long time in Palestine, even before the UN
proposal of partition of Palestine in November 1947 that granted 56 % of the territory to a Zionist State and
the rest to a Palestinian State that never came to existence26 (a plan that the Zionists accepted, almost certainly
after being sure the majority of the Arab States would reject it). In any event, the Palestinian people never really
had a chance to decide about its being de facto obliterated in favor of self-interested neighboring states. The UN
partition plan was severely flawed and granted the bigger and better slice of the contentious pie to the tiny
Jewish minority who then owned through JNF only about 5% of historic Palestine.
Much more revealing is the role of “exclusion” as a fundamental aspect of both public and privately held
land, introduced into Palestine by the Zionists. This modern notion of ownership (as well as that of state) was
foreign to previous Palestinian law of property27 and was responsible for the tensions generating the clashes of
the 1920s and of 1936. Even when privately and not communally held, agricultural land was never exclusive in
Palestine. As inMedieval Europe, the peasant communities came with the land and could inhabit and cultivate
it under the protection (sometimes the yoke) of an often-absentee landlord élite.
When Ashkenazi28 Zionists bought Palestinian land, often from such absentee owners, they brought with
them the idea of exclusion already codified in Europe. Accordingly, their instinctive behavior was to evict the
Palestinian peasants, as it was the documented policy of the JNF, the largest land purchaser. Titles of acquired
ownership displayed to the tenants to evict themwere ununderstandable in form and substance to the peasants,
who were used to having masters who would allow them to cultivate the land rather than leaving it idle for
future occupation. This clashwas the old, old story: very similar transactions occurred in colonial LatinAmerica
and Africa and this had been the sine qua non of enclosure and property modernization in Europe since at least
the sixteenth century.29
Impotence of international law
For a jurist, the conflict over state territory is not structurally different from that between two landowners both
claiming exclusivity over the same piece of land. Since the development of modern international law by Hugo
Grotius, a conflict over territory (where exclusive Westphalian sovereignty is involved) is a classic issue that
can be legally determined. Modern notions of national sovereignty (from Jean Bodin to Thomas Hobbes) have
always deployed stylized notions of Roman dominium to characterize the exclusivity of the claim of the nation
state.30 And, to be sure, if one reads the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) self-presentation, she would be
quite persuaded that a legal forum for such classic disputes were available also for Palestinian rights after the
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foundation of the UNwith the establishment of the ICJ in 1946: “The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with
international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States.”31
Unfortunately, the law never helped in deciding the dispute between two nations—the Palestinians and the
Zionists—over that small part of the Middle East called Palestine. The former was not recognized as an in-
dependent state (although a limited Vatican-like recognition was granted in 2012)32 while the latter obtained
statehood shortly after declaration of independence and garnered immediate recognition by the Cold War su-
perpowers.
Failing to be part of the solution, the law became part of the problem because it introduced into the already
complicated puzzle all the issues of Orientalism, racism, identity, and self-indulging narrative that are part of
the Western rhetoric on democracy and the rule of law.
To be sure, a large literature characterizes activities perpetrated under the color of the Zionist project as war
crimes, perhaps even as crimes against humanity. However, I do not find it useful to discuss Plan D deploying
the lingo and the aspirations of international legality that the UNwas born to construct in the aftermath of the
tragedy ofWorldWar II. I consider such formal legal notions belonging to a domain of transcendence: I prefer to
observe the reality of the conflict on Palestine within the much more trivial, material, and therefore immanent
notion of plunder as developed in Plunder: When the Rule of Law Is Illegal.33 It is in this perspective that
the law, setting aside the hypocritical veil of wishful thinking, reveals its true nature: a Western ideological
apparatus providing legitimacy to the rule of the stronger.
The rule of law has been, throughout the history of the relationship of the West with the Rest, a powerful
machinery of domination characterizing the Rest as lacking the rule of law and thus legitimizingWestern plun-
der. The commitment of the Israeli legal community to be part of the West and the investment of the State of
Israel in a strong “rule of law” identity are crucial and often neglected components in the history of plunder
in Palestine.34 Politically incapable or unwilling to respect international law, Israel has nevertheless massively
invested in building for itself an internationally recognized and well connected legal culture participating ac-
tively in the international effort of making comparative law a sibling discipline of international law in the global
legal academy.
Role of comparative law in normalizing plunder in palestine
The ICJwas established by treaty as part of theUNsystem right afterWorldWar II in 1945; it began its operations
in 1946. Article 38 of the treaty contains the official list of the “Sources of International Law.”Among them, after
customary law and treatises, are “[c]ommon principles recognized by the civilized nations.”
Ascertaining such common principles became one of the most important endeavors of comparative law,
perhaps a reason why this relatively new branch of international legal studies came of age around 1950, trying
to show the existence of areas of convergence at a level deeper than the “political,” even between Soviet law and
capitalist law.35 Clearly, the effort of the international legal community to understand through comparative law
the principles common to the “civilized” nations postulated a cryptic assumption of what was civilized and
what was not, something that in an era of still rampant colonialism was necessarily tainted by Orientalism (in
the sense of Palestinian scholar Edward Said).36
The selection of the countries whose laws would be compared in order to ascertain the existence of
“[c]ommon principles” became a crucial activity of cultural legitimization of a legal system as civilized.37 This
selection was not especially problematic for the countries belonging to the twomajorWestern legal traditions—
the common law and the civil law. Every legal taxonomy used by comparative law scholars to group loosely
together countries being part of the same legal family included both core and peripheral countries of the two
major legal families (now known as legal origins).38 In a sense, the closer to the core the closer to civilization,
being the legal heart of the very identity of Europe and the West. A variety of techniques were developed over
time by comparative lawyers to see commonalities between common law and civil law—no matter their stag-
gering technical differences—but since the very beginning it was assumed that whatever was common across
the great divide of Western law was, by definition, civilized.39 Thus, being Western became synonymous with
being civilized.
Comparative law came of age as a scholarly discipline around the years of the foundation of the State of Israel
under Cold-War conditions. As I have shown elsewhere, one important incentive to the reaching of this schol-
arly maturity was the major challenge of socialist law claiming, through a variety of epigones of the great jurist
Evgeny Pashukanis, the non-comparability of law across the capitalist vs. socialist divide. By 1950, the issue
was largely resolved, Pashukanis executed, and socialist law was already becoming the third family of modern
legal systems, after the civil law and the common law. The major topical books (David, Zweigert & Koetz, and
Schlesinger), which were posing the discipline of comparative law on sounder jurisprudential grounds than
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the previous black letter tradition of Legislation Comparé, all recognized socialist law as a modern legal system
with its own original characteristics of a model of “socialist legality.”40
As Teemu Ruskola has demonstrated, the early tradition of comparative law was highly Orientalist (as was
also the case of Karl Marx). Not only the laws of China, India, and Africa, but also the whole tradition of Islamic
law suffered this attitude. Through the second half of the last century, the legal systems of these countries were
grouped together in a sort of intellectual dump, of “other conceptions of” law, that almost by definition were
unable to contribute in the making of an international rule of law (being stuck in religious or traditional pre-
modern conceptions): these countries were not described for their positive attitudes but for what they lacked,
i. e., the rule of law.
As a consequence of this general attitude, quite coherently within the overall Zionist project of considering
Israel an oasis of Western civilization surrounded by less civilized people, the laws of Israel were described
as the only successors to the British Mandate over Palestine.41 Palestine itself lacked all real importance in the
Ottoman world, which left it sparsely populated and impoverished. For comparative law, the succession was
Ottoman Islamic law, English common law, Israeli law, itself fertilizing not only the desert but also the English
legal tradition through an injection of highly sophisticated civil law doctrine brought in by Ashkenazi jurists
from Italy, Poland, andGermany. Because of such layer of civil law tradition on a common law foundation, Israel
became a classic example of a mixed legal system working out original hybrid solutions highly interesting in a
global legal landscape that was beginning its process of Americanization.
Consequently, the international legal community had quite a lot to learn from the Israeli legal experience
of merging the common law and civil law traditions. In areas such as judicial lawmaking, property law, and
(even) constitutional law,42 Israelwas generally perceived by the international legal culture as a highly advanced
experiment, not only “the only democracy in the Middle East” but also the only system based on a rule of law
of a quite superior mixed quality.43 This highly sophisticated hybrid of the law was contributing to erase every
previous and contemporary legal experience in Palestine asmuch as the substance of plunder, thus normalizing
Israel in spite of all its own issues of international legality that an unbiased observation would have pointed
out.44
Plunder in palestine: an exception or the rule?
The international legal community has long been an accomplice in practices of international plunder so that it
would be quite naïve to single out its benevolent attitude toward Israel as a special scandal per se. Plunder is
the rule practically everywhere in the relationship of the West with the Rest and in Palestine it is historically
documented in great detail from the Roman destruction of the Temple through the Crusades.
True, there are a few specificities in the modern Palestinian situation that make such attitude especially
problematic. The quite recent historical moment makes the Israeli actions against the Palestinian people more
difficult to legitimize by law than those by the European colonists in the Americas or during the scramble
for Africa. In the mid-twentieth century, the fundamental fiction of law as a positivistic order separated from
politics—and thus to be studied and understood in its own terms by politically neutral and formalist jurists—
was challenged by sociological jurisprudence, realism, and a variety of anti-formalist movements. Lawyers
could no longer feel excused when ignoring political realities. The intimately political activity of state creation
is essentially a legal construction when it passes from the constituent to the constituted. Thus, it is singular
that most of the entries on Israel in international legal encyclopedias deploy a strategy of full normalization
with no mention whatsoever that most of the territory of the state (a constituent element of the very notion of
statehood) is either contested or occupied plainly against the law.45
Indeed, Israeli law has obtained a privileged status through the aforementioned notion of a paradoxically
unchallenged idea of a “mixed legal system,” civilized by definition, being the crossing point between the civil
law and the common law tradition. By such strategy, legal scholars have described the law of Palestine, a portion
of the Middle Eastern territory inhabited mostly by Muslim Arabs, as belonging to the Western legal tradition
(a concept in the making at the time) as opposed to all the other countries of the Middle East being classified
within the residual category of “other conceptions of” law.
This demonstrates an attitude of the international legal community’s being trapped in a cognitive bias in
favor of the Zionist project, especially because the notion of the Western legal tradition was developed through
the highly positivistic move of separating law from politics and from religion.46
Any unbiased observation of the law of Palestine/Israel, from theNakba to present, evidences a legal system
flatly in opposition to the separations among law, politics, and religion recognized as the essence of Western
law. Indeed, most of the territory of Palestine remains under a military rule of occupation and subject to a state
of emergency, repeatedly deemed contrary to international law, whose perpetuation has been possible only
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because of geopolitical reasons.47 This shows clearly the hegemonic role of politics in the law of Palestine/Is-
rael.48
Moreover, the very act of establishment of the State of Israel as reflected by its legal system was religious.
Denying the religious nature of the Zionist colonial project and the consequent structure of the Zionist State
would be an untenable position. Even if the declared principle of non-discrimination on the ground of religion,
contained in the fundamental laws of Israel, were not routinely violated by the law in action, the Jewishness
in the defining of Israeli citizenship renders Israeli law much closer to religious law than to a genuine Western
legal system. Conversion to Judaism is a ground for claiming citizenship and this fact alone supports the current
description of the different status in Israel between Jews and non-Jews as a regime of apartheid.49
However, through the notion of a mixed legal system of common law and civil law components, the inter-
national legal culture has participated in the project of inventing Israel as a Western legal system, civilized per
se (notwithstanding the practices of colonial plunder and the crimes perpetrated by the executors of the Zionist
project).50 The origins of the law in mixed legal systems are either the common law or the civil law: anything
else is no law, does not exist, or can be erased. To be sure, invariably the narrative on Israel begins with the
British Mandate’s introducing the common law tradition to make good the failed Ottoman religious (Muslim)
legal system.51
The outcome of this intellectual construction, whether in good or bad faith,52 has been the erasure of the
deep Palestinian layer of the law of Palestine/Israel, an erasure that has deployed, as in other historical experi-
ences of colonial plunder, the notion of empty land and civilization.
Thus, the construction of Israeli law as an advanced and sophisticated example of a mixed Western legal
system (now moving toward US law) is like the building of the beautiful forests that JNF has planted over
the ruins of the Palestinian villages destroyed during the Nakba. It is the invention of a Western legal enclave
of civilization,53 within the obscurantist world of “the Islamic legal tradition.” This attitude reproduces, well
within the twenty-first century, the old practices through which lawyers have served as agents of legitimacy for
plunder at home and abroad.54
As Roberto Esposito (one of the leading philosophers of the Italian theory) has recently written, Europe
(i. e., the West) has always projected its own issues outside of its borders, in a process of denial of its own
predicaments. The building of Fortress Israel, enclave of Western legal civilization within “savage” territory,
is exactly such a move and we must understand it as such. Centuries after the conquistadores and more than a
century after the scramble for Africa, the music has not changed. Israel is not outside of the West today; it is, in
its intimately internal essence, the polar opposite of our (congratulatory) self-perception based on the rule of
law. “Our” Fortress Israel is not only the shame (and the nightmare) of the Israelis living in denial of the crimes
and atrocities of their own founding fathers, the very same ones who “made the desert blossom.” It is also our
own shame and nightmare, surrounded as we are (just like Fortress Israel) by impoverished masses created by
our very project of domination and plunder that now because of the “iron laws of demography” endangers the
purity of our order based on the rule of law.55
Whoare the guilty parties?
Israel is no exception. It is the proxy of the West in its oppressive attitude toward the Rest. It is the whole
project of modernity—including its advanced socialist form that develops into imperialism—that should stand
the trial of history. The impossibility to find a peaceful solution to the tragedy in Palestine, without a revolu-
tionary change of attitude, is the metaphor for finding a future and a survival strategy without overcoming the
paradigm that has morphed into a savage assault on the mechanisms of reproduction of life on Earth.56
Unfortunately, modernity is not just Western capitalism but also its socialist spinoff that, while generating
hopes for emancipation, has embraced structures and policies that in theMiddle East are difficult to distinguish
from imperialism as an advanced development of capitalism.
Any unbiased discussion of the “making” of Israel and of its invention as aWestern law of Palestine covering
under a colonial project a whole civilization (including a legal civilization) requires coping with the issue of
the relationship between socialism and colonialism-imperialism.
To be sure, both the Israeli victory in the 1948 war and the full execution of Plan Dalet were made possible
because of heavy weapons (including aviation) provided by the Soviets through Czechoslovakia. In May 1948,
the Israeli Army received a major supply of modern 0.45 cannons, an example of the endowment of Israel with
an artillery superior to that of the Arab troops not only in Palestine but also in all Arab countries combined.57
The nature of the Zionist project was spelled out by Ben-Gurion, who euphorically annotated in his diary
that same day a full-fledged project of Western colonialism-imperialism, going beyond Jewishness and with
roots in pre-Islamic issues:
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We will establish a Christian State in Lebanon, whose southern border will be the Litani River. We will
bend Transjordan, we will bomb Amman and destroy its Army and at that point Syria will collapse; if
this notwithstanding Egypt will continue to fight we will bomb Port Said, Alexandria and Cairo. This
will be our vengeance for what they (Egyptians, Aramaics and Assyrians) did to our ancestors at the
time of the Bible.58
Having received the weapons from the Soviets, Ben-Gurion and his aides ordered the 12 brigades of the Army
to consider occupation of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Southern Lebanon.
The issue of the impact of the Cold War (which officially started with the so-called Truman Doctrine in
1947)59 on the Middle East and on the attitude to the Zionist project in particular is very complex and goes well
beyond the scope of this paper. Certainly, as mentioned above, both superpowers recognized the State of Israel
immediately and the perception that Zionismwas a “socialist” project (especially because of the early kibbutzim
movement) remained rooted in the European left for quite a long time.60
Possibly, supporting the Israeli War of Independence was a tactical move on Stalin’s part to weaken the
British imperialist presence in the Middle East, since England was the foe of unlimited Jewish immigration in
Palestine through World War II. As late as 1939, in spite of the Balfour Declaration (that in a lawyer’s inter-
pretation was made to say much more than it actually did), Britain officially declared that Palestine should not
become a Jewish State. Consequently, England was the target, together with the Arabs, of the Irgun’s attacks.
Such attacks included the 1946 bombing of the British headquarters at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem.61
The strength of the Communist Party in Israel is certainly part of the story as it probably was the sympathy
of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (at the time, the highest Palestinian authority) toward the governments of the
Axis that tainted somewhat the anti-Zionist Arab revolts of 1936. Another explanation of Communist early
attitudes toward Israel might have been the fact that it was the Red Army to arrive first at Auschwitz, thus
perceiving the full-fledged horrors of the Holocaust, that Israel was quite effective to exploit when its own turn
came to impose astonishing suffering upon innocent populations for ethnic reasons. The anti-Jewish pogroms
in pre-revolutionary Russia were not only instrumental to the birth of early Zionist doctrine but also generated
much of the early Ashkenazi influx of settlement in Palestine. Moreover, the desire to show theworld a clear-cut
change in Soviet Russian attitudes towards Jews also motivated Stalin’s early policy.62
However, it is a fact that shortly after recognition, the Soviet sympathy towards Israel declined somewhat
with the beginning of US hegemony that enormously increased also thanks to the prestige of the Zionist Orga-
nization of America, chaired by the famous jurist Louis Brandeis.
Comparative lawyers have emphasized the socialist roots of Israel: Israel is not only a secular mixed legal
system but also a “progressive” one. Moreover, Cold War conditions determined the coming to maturity of
comparative law as an academic project. Similarly, “Cold-War driven” is the development of a concept of West-
ern legal tradition thatmade the ideology of the rule of law a tremendously powerful tool in the post-war global
success of US law.63
Interestingly, during Cold War confrontation (although with variable intensity) the rule of law was con-
structed on both sides of the Iron Curtain as a powerful separating device between bourgeois law and socialist
legality to the point of denying any dialogue or even comparability of socialist and bourgeois law (following
both the Marx/Pashukanis orthodoxy and Andréi Yanuárievich Vyshinski’s Stalinist version). Nonetheless,
at the Nuremberg Trials—when the Holocaust became a legal fact generating responsibility for its perpetra-
tors—comparative law was deployed in practice and included a dialogue on legal principles between the US
and Soviet delegations. Clearly, at Nuremberg, some remarkable convergence took place.64 The tradition of the
winner’s trials to history was inaugurated there and the “Jewish question”was displayed in its DNA.65 The suf-
fering of Jews during the Holocaust has thus determined some sort of special status for Israel in international
law, a privilege—in the etymological sense of private law—that Israel claimed due to its (unquantifiable) risk
of destruction.
When it comes to the law, Zionists, Communists, and Western liberals proved to be more united by the
modernist project (with its obsession of putting the state at the center of the legal picture) than divided by their
political divisions and interests.
Israel was now a recognized state and its legal system was to be described and understood within the pos-
itivistic professional attitude.66
Think outside the state-centeredbox
Sirin was a Palestinian village (close to the limits of the Negev Desert) whose system of shared land tenure,
according to the description offered by Ilan Pappé, created the legal conditions for the development of a little
heaven in the middle of a very harsh climate. It was destroyed in 1948.
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In Haifa and many other cities, open communities of Palestinians, other Arabs, Jews, Christians, and Mus-
lims lived for centuries side by side developing trade, crafts, arts, culture, and customs—and, therefore, laws
governing such activities—beforeWestern plunder, in the form of Zionism, disrupted these institutions of com-
moning.67 To be sure, Islamic law owed since antiquity much to Jewish law and these two religious legal tra-
ditions, seen in comparative perspective, share principles, style, and fundamental values.68 Institutions such
as the Islamic Waqf and other antique systems of tenure and obligations were there to protect the poor and
what Westerners today call the “interests of future generations,” thus “reinventing the wheel” in our attempt
to set limits on the tyranny of exclusion determined by a structure of capitalist property law, which enlightened
jurisprudence finally understands as unsustainable.69
Aswe have seen, capitalist property law interpreted as pure exclusionwas introduced in Palestine by Zionist
(and perhaps British) colonizers and served as a significant irritant to the peaceful village life quite early in the
unfolding of the tragedy. Western conceptions of capitalist property law have been powerful weapons in the
ideology of plunder since the Latin American Conquista.70 The destruction of life in Palestine before and after
the Nakba has been ideologically supported by the same notion of uninhabited land: terra nullius owned by
no one and therefore “up for grabs” by colonists, a concept always deployed against aboriginal people from
America to Africa to Oceania. In Palestine, civilized Western European Jews were able to deploy the rhetoric
of the Catholic Spaniards in Latin America, of the White Anglo Saxon Protestants in North America, and of
the Dutch Afrikaans, French, Belgians, Portuguese, Germans, and Italians in their own respective targets of
plunder.71
In a perspective that is broad enough in time and space, what happened in the Nakba can be seen as part
of a general consequence of legal modernization, that we can call the catastrophe of the commons (both rural and
urban) and their complete substitution with two naturalized notions: exclusive private property and territorial
state sovereignty.72 This is what Marx called the primitive accumulation, a phenomenon that is in fact the
structural nature of capitalist extraction and requires seeing every episode not as an exception but as the rule.73
These two pillars of plunder—exclusive private property ownership and the sovereign state, the fundamen-
tal building blocks of Western rule of law—were as completely unknown to Palestine before Zionism as they
were unknown to America and Africa before their own ages of plunder. Before plunder, Palestine (as America
and Africa) was not empty, neither of people nor of law and institutions. It was populated by people whose
legal ways were variable, contextual, sometimes highly sophisticated, and in tune with the local ecology: legal
ways such as those that many legal anthropologists try to reconstruct74 andwhose structure, broadly speaking,
is that of customs making possible what Nobel Prize in Economics winner Elinor Ostrom called commoning.75
These aboriginal commons institutions are now covered, even in the local colonized imaginary, by the thick
layer of the modernist “box” just as the destroyed Palestinian villages are covered by forests or by the campus
of the University of Tel Aviv, the best clothing that plunder can wear to justify, dissimulate, or deny itself.
Because of this hiding or denial of the catastrophe of the commons, which is a regime of knowledge in the most
classical sense, lawyers and politicians resist thinking outside the box of modernity: this is why no creative
solution adapted to the circumstances has yet emerged. We consider utopian every thought outside the box,
when it seems that utopian is in fact the insistence of looking at the problem as if it were the solution.
Commons institutions were capable of keeping Jews and Arabs together in peace not only in Palestine and
the Middle East but also throughout Northern Africa, Sicily, and Spain before the events of the late fifteenth
century. Since the state and the centralization of power emerged onto the world stage, however, this has been a
forlorn quest.76
Any international legal community committed to critical knowledge as a prerequisite for a permanent solu-
tion should not participate in the erasure of such commons institutions under a thick layer of ideology. Rather,
like the archeologist digging for ruins of previous civilizations, the comparative legal scholar should explore
below the most recent layer of modern rule of law ideology in order to unearth, rediscover, understand, com-
pare, and make available to the legal culture of the world alternative arrangements that we are now seeking in
theory but failing to obtain in practice: peace and justice.
There is no romanticismor nostalgia in this vision. There is only the realistic humble assumption thatmoder-
nity has failed largely because of its laws, and that the rule of law’s being a product of Western imperialism is
the problem and as such cannot be part of the solution.77
In Palestine, the state and the rule of law ideology that it generates are foreign deadly intrusions just like a
pollutant in a lake. The Zionist movement was based onWestern notions of statehood: give a state to the Jewish
people: “A country without a people for a people without a country.” The current debate between One- and
Two-State solutions of the conflict is still based on the Western notion of statehood. But, as said before, Western
imposed institutions, being part of the problem, cannot be part of the solution and this seems the most compelling
reason to look into a No-State solution for Palestine that we could call a commons solution.78
Today, the state is a particularly obsolete tool to tackle thorny political issues, especially if we idealize it as a
tool for potential liberation of people: in fact, the state proves everywhere to be an instrument of oppression by
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the global élite of the masses. As an institution, it is weak with the strong (global corporations) and strong with
theweak (the “99%”). Palestine is no exception: seeking liberation through nationalism and state-centric visions
is just an illusion, indeed a nostalgic romantic nationalist utopia. The growth of the military-industrial complex
has reached proportions that Dwight Eisenhower could not have imagined when he denounced its risks in
his famous 1961 farewell speech.79 Palestine and the Middle East are perhaps the most lucrative market that
feeds this delirious global monster of corporate money and technological omnipotence. Private corporations,
whose growth is unfettered, now dominate states. They work as massive machines of capital concentration
supplanting, often through technology, what used to be state sovereignty.
The conflict in Palestine cannot be circumscribed in a box. It requires a general understanding of the evolving
global capitalist system and geopolitics, something still absent today in Palestinian studies. Not only in play
are states but also organized capital (for which states are merely disposable tools). Every day, we witness the
failure of the West in the Middle East. Concentration of power and exclusion in order to transform commons
into capital is its deeper structure.80
Do we want its reproduction in Palestine or might we more wisely, in order to “ma[k]e all the difference,”
travel “the road not taken”?81 It might well be that ecological and systemic thinking can offer some suggestions
on what to do … or at least of what not to do. Law is a living organism because it reflects the life of its users.82
Today, the law is dead in Palestine, having been killed by apartheid and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the State
of Israel.83 As with the corpse of a dictator we are unable to live without, the death of law is not recognized in
Israel. Rather, it is denied by dressing up the corpse in its most elegant clothing: a European progressive mixed
legal system. This strategy of denial and self-congratulation is itself deadly.84
When a living ecosystem is devastated by an external intrusion, such as phosphates generating algae that
kill a lake, the solution suggested by environmental scientists is to identify the intruder and protect a small
portion of the ecosystem, say a small cove, from it. In a shorter time than one might expect, life is regenerated
in that small part. From there, incrementally protecting other small portions, from the bottom up, little by little,
life can be restored throughout the lake because the ecological communities are open and can rescue each other.
Once having identified capitalist plunder and its institutions as the problem, an analogous strategy could
be considered for Palestine: making parts of it internationally protected and funding enclaves of community
regeneration. In such enclaves, soon to become a network of cities and villages, Palestinian refugees might
incrementally re-enter the community living side by side with open-minded Jewish Israelis engaging together
in arts, crafts, and sustainable agriculture in a desperately needed virtuous experimentation in post-capitalist
sharing society.
One could argue the kibbutz has already been such a non-capitalist organization of sharing that did not work
as an incentive for peaceful relationships.85 However, the kibbutz is not an ecological community, which by its
nature is open and hospitable, as were the early Palestinian villages and neighborhoods of towns and cities
where Arabs and Jews once lived together in peace. The enclaves of legal regeneration must be open and ready
to connect with similarly minded experiments producing a broad network without frontiers of communities
sharing problems and solutions. This network of villages and cities will claim autonomy incrementally from
vertical state arrangements, realizing ultimately the vision of commons without property and without states.86
Such experimentation would be extremely useful as well beyond the boundaries of Palestine, because the
demand for living institutions to substitute the deadly ones framed in the interest of themilitary-industrial com-
plex is strong today in many parts of the world suffering under neoliberal arrangements of individualization
and corporate control of the political process.87 Of course, the dimensions of the constituent communities will
limit the size of the network. Rather than being arbitrary (as the current sizes of most states and supranational
organizations such as the European Union), it will be determined by the ecology of the places presumably link-
ing together open communities sharing similar challenges and therefore interested in dealing with each other.
This is where a new Mediterranean institutional dimension might ultimately emerge, creating a much needed
living political dimension to substitute dead techno-bureaucracies such as the current EU. Indeed, the commu-
nities and the people of Southern Europe have so much more in common with those inhabiting the other side
of the Mediterranean than with northern communities of Continental Europe.
Many new institutional arrangements are out there to explore once the West will find the courage of declar-
ing the intellectual and political bankruptcy of its own project of modernization, including the many global
legal narratives, like so much of comparative law that has accompanied and still supports its deadly unfolding.
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Notes
1 Violinist and conductor Yehudi Menuhin, in the concluding moments of the four-and-one-half-hour documentary by Marcel Ophuls,
TheMemory of Justice (Paramount Pictures 1976), a film exploring then-recently allegedwar crimes in Algeria and Viêt Nam in the context
of Nazi atrocities and related Nuremberg Trials and addressing national and individual guilt.
2 I use the notion of plunder as developed in Ugo Mattei & Laura Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law Is Illegal (First ed. Blackwell
Publ’g 2008).
3 For a discussion of apartheid, see Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism and International Law in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (Virginia Tilley ed., Pluto Press 2012).
4 Ibid. at 82–83, considering “replacement of previous law…worse than capitulation.”
5 For a brilliant challenge to such exceptionalism, see Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West
Bank and Gaza (First ed. Univ. of Cal. Press 2005).
6 For a debate on the purposes of comparing laws, see Ugo A. Mattei, Teemu Ruskola & Antonio Gidi, Schlesinger's Comparative Law:
Cases, Text, Materials (Seventh ed. Found. Press 2009).
7 See Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in Vladimir I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Progress 1963),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/.
8 See Guy Debord, La société du spectacle (First ed. Les Éditions Gallimard 1967), in which that author calls “realized socialism” the
concentrated spectacle.
9 While the Cold War technically started in 1947, I use the term “long Cold War” to allude to the almost 75-year confrontation between
socialist and capitalist law that started immediately after the October Revolution of 1917 and ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in
1991. See JohnQuigley, Soviet Legal Innovation and the Law of the Western World (First ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
10 Loss by Palestinians of the majority of their territory, destruction or abandonment of several hundred Palestinian settlements, and
displacement of more than 700,000 Palestinians during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948; see Plunder in Palestine below.
11 See, e. g., Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism: China, the United States, and Modern Law (Harvard University Press 2013).
12 For a discussion of this concept, seeVernon V. Palmer, Mixed JurisdictionsWorldwide: The Third Legal Family (Second ed. Cambridge
Univ. Press 2012).
13 See George Emile Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rule: Law and Disorder in the West Bank (Reprint ed. Univ. of Tex.
Press 2012). Both Bisharat and Hajjar, op. cit. supra, insist that the very existence of professional lawyering in Palestine has been in reaction
to Zionist-imported stress on the rule of law: “It was Israel’s enthusiasm for law and the ornate legalism of the official discourse that
catalyzed the development of local human rights movement that served as harbinger of legalistic resistance” (49).
14 The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands is an 1899 poem by Rudyard Kipling about the American coloniza-
tion of the Philippines in the Spanish American War: it has been embraced, in spite of its theme of Eurocentric racism, as an ideological
justification for imperialism.
15 See Laura Nader, Culture and Dignity: Dialogues Between the Middle East and the West (First ed. Wiley-Blackwell 2012).
16 I embrace LauraNader’s opinionwhen shewrites, “I think the reasonUgoMattei and Iwere able towrite the book [see footnote 3 above]
together is he had no interest in being an anthropologist, and I had no interest in being a lawyer …” Laura Nader, Law and Intercultural
Competence, 26 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L. J. 123 (2013) (presented on 8 August 2011 at the 2011 Pacific McGeorge Workshop on
Promoting Intercultural Legal Competence in Lake Tahoe, California) at 126.
17 Marcel Liebman, 7 Israel, Palestine and Zionism 89–109 (Brian Pearce trans., The Socialist Register 1970),
http://www.socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5292/2193, at 90.
18 See, e. g., Laura Westra, Faces of State Terrorism (Studies in Critical Social Sciences) (Reprint ed. Haymarket Books 2014).
19 SeeMichael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Harvard Univ. Press 2009).
20 I rely, in this paragraph, on the data and evidence offered in the thoroughly documented first hand reconstruction of Ilan Pappé, The
Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Reprint ed. Oneworld Publications 2007).
21 Lohamei Herut Israel, also known as the Stern Gang.
22 SeeMarcia Gelpe, The Israeli Legal System (Carolina Academic Press 2013) at 444–46.
23 See Ugo Mattei, Socialist and Non-Socialist Approaches to Land Law: Continuity and Change in Somalia and Other
African States, 16 Rev. of Socialist L. 17–55 (1990), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=
https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2287&context=faculty_scholarship.
24 See, e. g., Benny Morris, Israel and the Palestinians, The Irish Times, 21 February 2008 (Opinion: Letter),
https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/israel-and-the-palestinians-1.896017.
25 Public debates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are a recurring phenomenon in the Academy, particularly when this issue becomes
topical based on a well-publicized military, political, or diplomatic event or on the contemporaneous publication of a book by at least
one of the interlocutors. One infamous example (and subsequent feud) was the joint appearance of Two-State solution advocate Harvard
Professor of Law Alan Dershowitz and then DePaul Professor Norman Finkelstein on Democracy Now! on 24 September 2003, in which
the latter concluded, in connection with the former’s new book The Case for Israel, “Mr Dershowitz has concocted a fraud … which
amazingly, in large part, he plagiarized from another fraud. I found that pretty shocking.” Dershowitz–Finkelstein Debate (Democracy
Now!) (YouTube 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C6To-o-aiRg, at 10 minutes. Professor Finkelstein—himself the child of Nazi
concentration camp survivors—has argued (at significant personal career cost) that the horror of the Holocaust has been hijacked into an
ideology to protect the State of Israel and the role it plays in aiding US imperial domination of the Middle East. See Norman G. Finkelstein,
The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (Second ed. Verso 2015).
Another example was the written exchange between Columbia Professor Jonathan Schorsch and NYU Professor Bertell Ollman, in which
the latter writes of “a half century of Zionist assassinations, collective punishments, ethnic cleansing, imprisonments, tortures, cutting off
life resources (of water, electricity, food, education, housing and jobs), and constant humiliations.” Bertell Ollman, Love of Israel? (Tikkun
2005), https://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/love_of_israel.php.
See, also, the debate between Professor Dershowitz and MIT Professor Noam Chomsky at the Kennedy School of Government on 29
November 2005. Dershowitz vs Chomsky Debate Israel at Harvard (YouTube 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ux4JU_sbB0.
26 SeeAllan Gerson, Israel, theWest Bank and International Law (First ed. Cass 1978). For access to various topical UNdocuments over
1947–2017, including selected Security Council Resolutions and General Assembly Documents, see UN Documents for Israel/Palestine
(Sec. Council Report 2018), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/israelpalestine/.
27 See Iris Agmon, Family & Court: Legal Culture and Modernity in Late Ottoman Palestine (Syracuse Univ. Press 2005).
28 Ashkenazim, constituting themajority of worldwide Jewry, are diaspora Jews originating fromCentral and Eastern Europe, as contrasted
with Sephardim (Jews from communities settled in the Iberian Peninsula) and Mizrahim (Jews from the Middle East); the third category is
often conflated with Sephardim.
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29 Today, a similar scheme—known as land grabbing—is used by global corporations and sovereign funds in Africa in their development
of capitalist monoculture.
30 See Fritjof Capra & Ugo Mattei, The Ecology of Law: Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community (First ed. Berrett-
Koehler 2015).
31 The Court (Int’l Court of Justice 2017), http://www.icj-cij.org/en/court.
32 By Motion of 29 November 2012, the UN General Assembly granted to Palestine “non-member observer State status” with a motion
passed by 138 Yes, 9 No, and 43 abstentions.
33 Mattei & Nader, op. cit. supra.
34 The attempt is to depoliticize politics. See a blatant example inMartin Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel (First ed. Univ.
of Va. Press 1994).
35 See Ugo Mattei, The Cold War and Comparative Law: A Reflection on the Politics of Intellectual Discipline, 65 The Am. J. of Comp. L. 567–07
(2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avx024.
36 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Vintage Books ed. Random House 1979).
37 Themost comprehensive andmasterly discussion of the “common core” project remains, even after a half century, Introduction in Rudolf
B. Schlesinger, 1 Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems (Oceana Publications 1968).
38 See the classic René David, Camille Jauffret-Spinosi & Marie Goré, Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains (12th ed. Dalloz
2016). See, also, Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 The Am. J. of Comp. L. 5–44 (1997),
https://doi.org/10.2307/840958.
39 See Ugo Mattei & Luca G. Pes, Civil Law and Common Law: Toward Convergence? (Gre-
gory A. Caldeira, Daniel Kelemen & Keith E. Whittington eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008),
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199208425-e-15.
40 For a description of this notion, see William Elliott Butler, Soviet Law (Second ed. Butterworths 1988). See, also, John B. Quigley,
Soviet Legal Innovation and the Law of the Western World (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
41 See StephenGoldstein, Israel: Creating a New Legal System fromDifferent Sources by Jurists fromDifferent Backgrounds in Esin Örücü, Elspeth
Attwooll & Sean Coyle, Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed and Mixing (Kluwer Law Int’l 1996) at 147.
42 See Israeli Constitutional Law in theMaking (Gideon Sapir, Daphne Barak-Erez&Aharon Barak eds., Hart Publ’g 2013) (Hart Studies
in Comparative Public Law).
43 Edelman at 100.
44 David Carey Miller (South Africa: A Mixed System Subject to Transcending Forces in Örücü at 176) has recognized for South Africa what
no one has pointed out for Israel: “The development of a sophisticated system of private law is on one assessment an insignificant feature
of a overall legal context dominated by discriminatory and oppressive legislation.” Stephen Goldstein does not mention this state of affairs
in Israel; on the contrary, he considers Israeli public law “a bastion of the common law” (150).
45 See Eyal Benvenisti, Legal Dualism: The Absorption of the Occupied Territories into Israel (First ed. Westview Press 1990): “with
the fiction of belligerent occupation Israel has succeeded in slowly absorbing the territories without having to share political or economic
power with the local population resorting to a symbolic act of annexation” (58).
46 See Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, op cit. supra.
47 See, e. g., Menachem Finkelstein & Yifat Tomer, The Israeli Military Legal System—Overview of the Current Situation and a Glimpse into the
Future, 52 A.F. L. Rev. 137–68 (2002). Hajjar, op. cit. supra, notes in her important book on the Israeli military court system how counter-
hegemony can emerge: “it was Israel’s enthusiasm for law and the ornate legalism of official discourse that catalyzed the development of
local human rights movement that served as harbinger of legalistic resistance” (49). For one of the most dramatic and less acknowledged
issues, see Amanda Cahill-Ripley, The Human Right to Water and Its Application in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (First ed.
Routledge 2011).
48 See David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (State Univ. of New York
Press 2002); Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2010 Hum. Rts. Watch,
(December 2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt1210webwcover_0.pdf; and Hajjar, op. cit. supra.
49 See Tilley, op. cit. supra.
50 See, in a broader context, Alain Dieckhoff, L'invention d'une nation: Israël et la modernité politiqe (Gallimard 1993).
51 See, among many, Gelpe, op. cit. supra, at 47, and Daniel Schorsch & Uri Shoham, The Legal System of Israel, Legal Systems Cyclopedia
Ch 6 Vol 5, 120–23. Israel is described as “firmly rooted in western conception of the rule of law” and contributing to the well known
theory of empty land: “As a result of Mamluck destruction in the coastal plain this area remained almost empty of population until Jewish
resettlement toward the end of the nineteenth century.”
52 For another example of normalization, see The Seventh Joint Annual Exchange and Conference: Judicial Review in Comparative
German-Israeli Perspective (Dirk Olzen & Susanne Schwarz eds., Baden-Baden 2004).
53 See Yadin, Israel, in 1 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law: National Reports (Mouton 1973), according to whom, “Within
the community ofwestern systems Israel private lawmay be classified as progressive” (79). See, also, in similarly “politically neutral” terms,
S. Colombo, Israele, in 10 Digesto Discipline Privatistiche—Sezione Civile 201 (1993).
54 See Kretzmer.
55 Sophia Hoffman, A Sovereign for All: The Management of Refugees As Nation-State Politics, in The Politics of Humanitarianism: Power,
Ideology and Aid (Antonio De Lauri ed., I. B. Tauris 2016) at 147.
56 For the historical roots of this argument, see Capra & Mattei,op. cit. supra.
57 This military superiority of the Zionist State has been maintained (and increased) to this day with the help of the United States.
58 Pappé at 179.
59 See Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict Over East Europe (Princeton Univ. Press 2016).
60 See Jerome Slater, The Superpowers and the Arab-Israeli Political Settlement: The Cold War Years, 105 Pol. Sci. Q. 557–77 (1990–91) at 558.
61 See Ramona Tausz, WATCH: The King David Hotel Bombing, 1946, The Times of Israel, 3 September 2015,
http://www.timesofisrael.com/watch-the-king-david-hotel-bombing-1946/.
62 Similarly, the United States may have been motivated in part by the US Government’s feelings of guilt:
World War II prompted the largest displacement of human beings the world has ever seen … But even with millions of European Jews
displaced from their homes, the United States had a poor track record offering asylum. Most notoriously, in June 1939, the German ocean
liner St Louis and its 937 passengers, almost all Jewish, were turned away from the port of Miami, forcing the ship to return to Europe;
more than a quarter died in the Holocaust.
Daniel A. Gross, The U.S. Government Turned Away Thousands of Jewish Refugees, Fearing That They Were Nazi Spies,
(Smithsonian 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/us-government-turned-away-thousands-jewish-refugees-fearing-they-
were-nazi-spies-180957324/.
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63 For a detailed discussion, see Ugo Mattei, The Cold War and Comparative Law: A Reflection on the Politics of Intellectual Discipline, op. cit.
supra.
64 On the other hand, for descriptions of disagreements between the US and Soviet Nuremberg delegations, see Mattei, Ruskola & Gidi,
op. cit. supra, at 837–38, and Francine Hirsch, The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order, 113
The Am. Hist. Rev. 701–30 (2008), http://www.jstor.org/stable/30223049 (the latter’s detailing, based on then relatively new evidence from
Soviet archives, how Nuremberg “became one of the first fronts of the Cold War” (726) and “was about politics that motivated the United
States to pursue its postwar agenda through the [International Military Tribunal] at the expense of the Soviet Union” (730)).
See, generally (and comprehensively), Robert H. Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the Inter-
national Conference on Military Trials: A Documentary Record of Negotiations of the Representatives of the United States of
America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Culminating in the Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Dep’t of
State, United States of Am. 1949) (negotiations held June 26 to 8 August 1945, at which representatives “made formal statement of the
principles of substantive law and agreed upon methods of procedure for the prosecution and trial of the major European war criminals”),
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